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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-EQUAL PROTECTION: VALIDITY OF R.C.W.

§

9.87.010(13), WASHINGTON'S SCHOOL LOITERING STATUTE-State v.
Oyen, 78 Wn. 2d 909, 480 P.2d 766 (1971), vacated mem. sub nom.
Oyen v. Washington, 408 U.S. 933 (1972).
Defendants were arrested under authority of R.C.W. § 9.87.010
(13),' Washington's school loitering statute, for having distributed
anti-Vietnam war leaflets to students on school premises in knowing
violation of a school board regulation which required prior approval
by the superintendent of nonschool-related handouts. 2 The peaceful
distribution occurred prior to morning classes as students were
leaving their busses. 3 Defendants subsequently were convicted, although they contended that the statute was unconstitutionally vague
and overbroad and as applied violated their right to free speech. On
appeal to the Washington Supreme Court, the conviction was affirmed. Held: R.C.W. § 9.87.010(13) 4 is constitutional: the statute is
sufficiently specific in terms of time, place and tenor to satisfy procedural due process and withstand a vagueness attack; its breadth is justified as a reasonable exercise of the state's police power to safeguard
the orderly education of youth; and it was applied evenhandedly so as
1. Washington's school loitering law is a subsection of the state's vagrancy statute,
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.87.010 (Supp. 1972), the pertinent part of which reads:
Every(13) Person, except a person enrolled as a student in or parents or guardians of

such students or person employed by such school or institution, who without a
lawful purpose therefor wilfully loiters about the building or buildings of any

public or private school or institution of higher learning or the public premises adjacent thereto-

is a vagrant, and shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not more
than six months, or by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars.
None of the defendants belonged to any class exempted by the statute. See note 4

infra for future disposition of WASH. REV. CODE § 9.87.010(13).
2. See Bellingham (Washington) School Board Superintendent's Bulletin No. 5,
Aug. 8, 1968.
3. There was no evidence to indicate that defendants instigated violence or caused
disruption, 78 Wn. 2d at 912, 480 P.2d at 768; at most, some of the approximately 150

students who witnessed the subsequent arrests expressed their disapproval of defendants
with boos and hisses.
4.

WASH. REV. CODE § 9.87.010 (Supp. 1972) has been amended by ch. 122, § 29

[1972] Wash. Laws, 2d Ex. Sess., effective Jan. 1, 1974. At that time the school
loitering subsection, formerly WASH. REV. CODE § 9.87.010(13) (Supp. 1972), will

become new WASH. REV. CODE § 9.87.010(11) with no change in wording.
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not to discriminate against the defendants' viewpoints. State v. Oyen,
78 Wn. 2d 909, 480 P.2d 766 (1971). On appeal to the United States
Supreme Court, the judgment was vacated and remanded for further
consideration in light of Police Department of the City of Chicago v.
Mosley 5 and Grayned v. the City of Rockford. 6 Oyen v. Washington,
7
408 U.S. 933 (1972).
Mosley and Grayned are two United States Supreme Court cases
resting on principles of equal protection, an issue that never appeared
in the opinion of the Washington court. Since previous constitutional
challenges to loitering and kindred laws 8 primarily have relied upon
the due process doctrines of void for vagueness and overbreadth, 9 the
Oyen remand comes as a noteworthy departure from this pattern. As
neither Mosley nor Grayned dealt with loitering laws, application of
these precedents to the school loitering statute in Oyen demonstrates
5. 408 U.S. 92(1972).
6. 408 U.S. 104(1972).
7. The case was subsequently remanded by the Washington Supreme Court to the
Whatcom County Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with the United
States Supreme Court memorandum opinion, and, as of May 2, 1973, no further action
had been taken.Telephone interview with RandJack, Corresponding Attorney, A.C.L.U.,
May 2, 1973.
8. Variously labelled as vagrancy, loitering, disorderly conduct, and breach of the
peace, intentionally broad laws directed at inchoate crime form a special body of law
characterized by the amorphous nature of its subdivisions. See Comment, Vagrancy and
Related Offenses, 4 HARV. Civ. RiGHTS-Civ. LIB. L. REV. 291 (1969). WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9.87.010 (Supp. 1972) provides a typical example. While entitled a vagrancy statute,
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.87.010 encompasses disorderly persons (id. § 9.87.010(7)) and
persons loitering about school premises (id. § 9.87.010(13)), as well as fortune tellers,
prostitutes, "common" gamblers, drug users and others normally deemed vagrants. It
seems to make little difference in terms of either enforcement or judicial treatment
whether such related laws are codified separately or under one heading.
9. Impermissible vagueness and overbreadth, doctrines grounded respectively on
procedural and substantive due process, have generated a considerable body of law in
the loitering-related areas. Many of the relevant cases are collected and discussed in
three useful annotations: Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 836 (1969) (Validity of Loitering Statutes
and Ordinances); Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 792 (1969) (Validity of Vagrancy Statutes and
Ordinances); and Annot., 12 A.L.R.3d 1448 (1967) (Vagueness as Invalidating Statutes
or Ordinances Dealing with Disorderly Persons or Conduct).
Although the Washington court had never before been confronted with the exact question it encountered in Oyen, the constitutionality of state school loitering statutes had
been upheld previously in several jurisdictions against challenges based on vagueness
and overbreadth. See, e.g., Mandel v. Municipal Court, 276 Cal. App. 2d 649, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 173 (1969); In re Huddleston, 229 Cal. App. 2d 618, 40 Cal. Rptr. 581 (1964);
People v. Johnson, 6 N.Y.2d 549, 161 N.E.2d 9, 190 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1959). For a discussion of potential vagueness and overbreadth problems in the school loitering clauses of
Oregon's new criminal code, see 51 ORE. L. REV. 624, 634-37 (1972).
For recent Washington discussion concerning vagueness in loitering and vagrancy
laws, see State v. Fisk, 79 Wn. 2d 318, 485 P.2d 81 (1971) (WASH. REV. CODE §
9.87.010(13) (1965) not unconstitutionally vague); Seattle v. Drew, 70 Wn. 2d 405, 423
P.2d 522 (1967) (Seattle loitering ordinance vague for lack of ascertainable standards).
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the willingness of the Burger Court to expand the scope of equal protection review into relatively untested areas of the law. The objective
of this note is to critically explore the equal protection problems inherent in R.C.W. § 9.87.010(13) and in the Oyen court's construction
of that statute in terms of both the strict standard principles enunciated in Mosley and Grayned and the United States Supreme Court's
emerging requirement, under a revitalized rational basis standard, of a
more clearly demonstrable connection between a state's goals and the
means used to accomplish them. 10
I.

STRICT SCRUTINY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Since Mosley and Grayned were dispositive of the Oyen appeal, a
thorough understanding of these two Supreme Court cases is essential
to evaluate the Washington decision and associated statute.
At issue in both Mosley and Grayned was the constitutionality of
antipicketing ordinances which made unlawful any nonlabor picketing
carried on within a prescribed distance of a school building while
classes were in session." Since the equal protection issue in Grayned
'2
was tersely resolved on the basis of "the reasons given in Mosley,'
3
further discussion of the Mosley holding applies equally to Grayned.'
Writing for the majority in Mosley, Mr. Justice Marshall found the
petitioner's claim "closely intertwined with First Amendment interests" and concluded that the central deficiency of the Chicago ordinance was its description of allowable picketing in terms of subject

10. For a discussion of the parameters of the current standard, see the text accompanying notes 32-37 infra and authority cited therein.,
11. With the exception of two unimportant words, the ordinances challenged in
Mosley and Grayned were identical. CHICAGO MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 193-1 (i) (1968), the
relevant ordinance in Mosley, 408 U.S. at 92-93, is set out below:
A person commits disorderly conduct when he knowingly:
(i) Pickets or demonstrates on a public way within 150 feet of any primary or secondary school building while the school is in session . .. proided, that this
subsection does not prohibit the peaceful picketing of any school involved in a
labor dispute ....
See also ROCKFORD, ILL., ORDINANCE CODE ch. 28, § 18.1(i) (1969), the ordinance challenged in Grayned, 408 U.S. at 107.
12. 408 U.S. at 107.
13. In addition to holding an antipicketing ordinance unconstitutional on the equal
protection-first amendment principles voiced in Mosley, Grayned sustained an antinoise ordinance as facially constitutional against vagueness and overbreadth attacks.
408 U.S. at 107-21.
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matter, impermissible under the Court's strict interpretation of the
first amendment.' 4 Merging this first amendment holding with fourteenth amendment principles, the majority concluded that since the
ordinance treated some picketers differently than others, it also violated the command of the equal protection clause, t 5 because "government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds
acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or
more controversial views."' 6 In response to the city's defense that the
ordinance was a legitimate device for preventing school disruption,

14. 408 U.S. at 96, citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964):
Any restriction on expressive activity because of its content would completely
undercut the "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open."
Cf. the concurring opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Burger, who points out that well established exceptions such as libel and obscenity prevent the first amendment from literally
meaning that individuals are guaranteed the right to express any thought free from government censorship. 408 U.S. at 102-03.
15. Id. at 95. Writing for the majority, Mr. Justice Marshall concluded that in all
equal protection cases the crucial question is whether there exists an "appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered by the differential treatment." Id. This very general statement of the equal protection test does not fit neatly into the conventional,
two-tier analytical framework discussed in the text accompanying notes 18-20 infra, and
reflects Mr. Justice Marshall's general malaise with the rigid two-tier analysis. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Marshall's general test in Mosley suggests a continuum where what is "appropriate" or "suitable" may vary in degree according to the type of regulation, classification and state
interest involved, and whether or not "protected rights" are affected.
16. 408 U.S. at 96. Mr. Justice Marshall characterized his merger of first and fourteenth amendment principles as the "intersection" between the first amendment and
equal protection. Although the terminology may be new, the basic concept is not. The
Court previously has combined equal protection analysis of speech issues with considerations of censorship to strike down regulatory schemes which discriminate against a religious group based on the viewpoints of its members; see Fowler v. Rhode Island. 345
U.S. 67 (1953); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951). See also the concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Black in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 581 (1965), wherein a
statute proscribing obstruction of public passages which excepted labor picketers from
its prohibition was held violative of the first and fourteenth amendments. The majority
in that case felt that the statute lodged unfettered discretion in public officials, allowing
them to act as censors and raising an "inherent" equal protection problem along with
the clear first amendment threat. 379 U.S. at 557. The gist of the intersection doctrine is
that courts will apply the stricter test of the equal protection clause to state classifications which impinge upon first amendment rights (e.g., by discriminating on the basis of
content or by chilling free expression). See the discussion in the text accompanying
notes 20-22 infra and authority cited therein. Application of the doctrine is infrequent,
since courts commonly resort to provisions of the Consitution (e.g., due process) other
than the equal protection clause to safeguard fundamental rights. See Comment, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1087-133 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Developments]. First amendment-equal protection has been
referred to as an "embryonic concept"; see Blasi, Prior Restraints on Demonstrations,
68 MICH. L. REV. 1482, 1492 n.41 (1970). For further discussion of the doctrine, see
also Kalven, The Concept of the PublicForum, 1965 SUP. CT. REv. 1, 29-30.
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Mr. Justice Marshall articulated the standard which the challenged
7
law was held to have violated:'
The Equal Protection Clause requires that statutes affecting First
Amendment interests be narrowly tailored to their legitimate objectives. . . . Far from being tailored to a substantial governmental interest, the discrimination among pickets is based on the content of
their expression.
The test applied in Mosley exemplifies the compelling state interest
standard, the strictest brand of review exercised under the two-tier
equal protection formulation which emerged from the Warren Court.' 8
Partially as a reaction to the past abuses of substantive due process,
the Warren Court, under a rational basis standard, applied minimal
scrutiny to classifications regulating economic, business and most social matters. 19 However, where the classification involved the sensitive
issues of race, alienage or political belief, or where it threatened protected rights to which the Warren Court was so responsive, the Court
applied a more exacting standard of review which placed a heavy
burden on the state to show that the differentiation was necessary to
further a compelling state interest.20 This strict standard was invoked
17. 408 U.S. at 101-02, citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), and Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). Both of these cases, discussed in The Supreme
Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV. 50, 104 (1972), are equal protection-first amendment cases wherein the strict equal protection standard discussed in the text accompanying notes 19-21 infra was applied.
18. Mosley has been subsequently cited as standing for the proposition that classifications affecting first amendment rights will trigger strict review. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 1297 n.75 (1973) (financing schools
through ad valorem tax on property held not violative of equal protection clause); and
Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. I (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Gunther].
For informative commentary discussing the dual standard of equal protection review
developed by the Warren Court, see Developments, supra note 16; Comment, Equal
Protection and Benign Racial Classification: A Challenge to the Law Schools, 21 AM.
U.L. REV. 736, 739-41 (1972); and Gunther, supra, at 8-10.
19. Substantive due process has carried repugnant connotations from the early part
of the twentieth century when it was used by the Court to justify subjective intervention
into terrain properly reserved for the wisdom of the legislature. See Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 467 (1972) (Burger, CJ., dissenting). Minimal equal protection scrutiny
is one manifestation of the resultant hands-off attitude toward state economic, business
and social regulation.
20. See Gunther, supra note 18, at 8-10 and 21; and Developments, supra note 16,
at 1087-133. For a recent statement of the strict compelling state interest standard, see
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972).
Mr. Justice Marshall's use of "tailored" and "substantial governmental interest" to
describe the standard applied in Mosley, 408 U.S. at 101-02, characteristically avoids
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by the presence of whatever the Court designated on an ad hoc basis
as a "suspect classification" or "fundamental interest."12 Strict review
was applicable in.
Mosley because first amendment rights have been
held to constitute fundamental interests, 22 and the Chicago ordinance
abridged these rights by differentiations based on content of expression.
Viewed in the analytical framework of Mosley, R.C.W. §
9.87.010(13) does not present as blatant an example of facial content
discrimination; its exception of students, parents, guardians and
school employees from the statute's prohibition 23 is not parallel to the
Mosley exception of labor picketers because the basis of the Washington statute's classifications involves a natural relationship to the
school rather than the content of expression. Nevertheless, in Oyen as
in Mosley, strict review of statutory classifications was triggered by
24
limitation of defendants' first amendment rights.
By broadly construing the phrase "without a lawful purpose" to
encompass those who would remain upon school grounds without
authorization or a school-related purpose as well as those who would

the words of art, "necessary" and "compelling state interest," normally used to delineate
the strict standard. But there can be little doubt that the substance of the Mosley test was
intended to be strict scrutiny, since Mr. Justice Marshall has subsequently cited Mosley
as authority for that doctrine. See San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1330 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Cf. the general equal protection test voiced in Mosley, discussed in note 15 supra.
21. Strict review has been called the new equal protection. By carving out specific
suspect classifications and fundamental interests, the Court transformed the nearly
dormant equal protection clause into a potent weapon within these narrowly delineated
areas. Thus, suspect classifications such as race (Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967))
or alienage (Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)) will trigger the compelling
state interest test, as will fundamental interests such as voting rights (Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)), interstate travel (Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969)) and criminal appeals (Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)).
22. See Dunn v. Blumenstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (voting rights); Williams v.
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (voting rights and freedom of association); Harper v. Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting rights). Although Williams contained language
which generally accorded first amendment rights the protection of strict scrutiny, 393
U.S. at 3 1, Mosley solidified the status of first amendment free speech as an equal protection fundamental interest.
23. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.87.010(13) (Supp. 1972), reproduced in note I supra.
24. There can be little doubt that defendants' pamphleteering constituted an exercise of first amendment rights of free speech in light of the Supreme Court's reliance on
Mosley and Grayned, both of which involved invalid restrictions on expressive activity
-picketing. The rights of freedom of speech and freedom of press embrace the right to
carry signs in public places as well as the right to distribute literature in public. For
cases wherein the Court invalidated broad permit systems dealing with pamphleteering.
see Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S.
147 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
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do so with criminal motives, 25 the Washington court established a
standard of conduct which limits the activity of all but those of the
excepted classes. This differing treatment cannot be sustained under
the Mosley strict standard, 2 6 because such a broad classification is not
necessary to achieve the avowed statutory purpose of preventing material disruption of the educational system.27 Blanket exclusion of persons bearing an intimate relationship to the school from the proscriptions of the school loitering statute without regard to whether their
intent is disruptive or nondisruptive is arbitrary and does not further
the state interest as demanded by the stricter standard. 28 Indeed, the
present statute may thwart the vital state interest involved by allowing
a parent, guardian or school employee to enter upon school premises
with a declared and unlawful intent to disrupt, while stifling the
peaceful expression of those seeking, as defendants did, to communicate a political ideal. The failure of R.C.W. § 9.87.010(13) to preserve
a rational connection between the state's purpose and the classification
used to achieve that end is decisive of the equal protection issue in
Oyen, obviating any need to resolve the difficult question of whether
29
the state interest involved is a compelling one.
Nor can the statute be made to pass equal protection muster simply
by judicially excising all applications of the statute which involve a
fundamental interest and thus trigger strict review. Such a curative
25.

78 Wn. 2d at 917, 480 P.2d at 771.

26. But statutory exclusion of students may be validly retained, since a primary
purpose of school loitering statutes is to protect this class of persons. See note 27 infra.
Disruption caused by students themselves is conduct that falls within school disciplinary
regulation, not a school loitering statute.
27. The Oyen court stated the statutory purpose as follows:
Undoubtedly, it is aimed at maintaining a scholastic atmosphere as well as protecting school properties and preserving the moral and physical safety and
well-being of the student body from the intrusion and harassment of degenerates,
dope peddlers, pornographers, vandals, troublemakers in general [and others who
desire to utilize school premises for purposes detrimental to the educational process].
78 Wn. 2d at 914, 480 P.2d at 768-69. Material disruption of the educational process is
the standard evil sought to be averted by school loitering laws. See, e.g., Mandel v.

Municipal Court, 276 Cal. App. 2d 649, 81 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1969); People v. Johnson, 6
N.Y.2d 549, 161 N.E.2d 9, 190 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1959).
28. See text accompanying note 20 supra and authority cited therein for a discussion of the analytical parameters of strict review.
29.

Courts have long stressed the importance of preventing school disruption with

adjectives such as "substantial," "legitimate." or "paramount." See, e.g., Mosley,
U.S. at 99 ("Cities certainly have a substantial interest in stopping picketing which
rupts a school."); Mandel v. Municipal Court, 276 Cal. App. 2d 649, 81 Cal. Rptr.
(1969); Newman v. Schlarb, 184 Wash. 147, 152, 50 P.2d 36, 39 (1935). Whether
interest is compelling in the equal protection context remains for future decision.

408
dis173
this
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measure may have been feasible under the minimal scrutiny standard
of the Warren Court which vested state legislation with a strong presumption of constitutionality so long as the challenged classification
bore a rational relation to any conceivable state interest. 30 However,
recent developments strongly suggest that this standard of limited review is being replaced by a revitalized and more interventionist ra3
tional basis test. '
II.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE STATUTE
UNDER THE RATIONAL BASIS
STANDARD

In six instances last Term, the Court upheld equal protection claims
or remanded them for consideration without explicit resort to the
strict scrutiny formula. 32 These cases marked a definite departure
from the lenient brand of review previously applied in the absence of
a fundamental interest or suspect classification. 33 A precise delineation
of the standard represented by this trend is, of course, impossible
given its short existence, but the new cases cannot be dismissed as ad
hoc judicial anomalies. The rough pattern emerging from them reveals two primary elements: (1) the Court is less willing to accept any
conceivable state interest but instead may require an affirmative
30. The liberality of this ends-oriented test lies in its allowance of any conceivable
state purpose to justify the legislative means. A court is thus authorized to speculate as
to what a legislature intended and broadly defer to legislative expertise. The practical
result was usually something less than minimal review. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams.
397 U.S. 471 (1970) (maximum welfare grants); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S.
483 (1955) (state regulation of visual care). See also Developments, supra note 16. at
1076-87.
31. See Gunther. supra note 18, at 10-48.
32. See James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972) (Kansas' method of recouping legal
defense fees for indigent defendants invalidated); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715
(1972) (Indiana provision for pretrial commitment of incompetent criminal defendants
held discriminatory); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (invalidation of discrimination between legitimate children and dependent unacknowledged illegitimates in distribution of workmen's compensation benefits for death of common
father); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972) (difference in commitment procedures between Wisconsin's Sex Crime Act and Mental Health Act held violative of rational standard); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (minimum rationality not
found in Massachusetts' scheme concerning distribution of contraceptives); Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (Oregon statute requiring posting of double rent bond
as prerequisite for appeal of eviction action held to bear no reasonable relationship to
any valid state objective); and Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (Idaho probate provision giving men mandatory preference over women when persons of same priority
class applied for appointment as administrator held unconstitutional). With the exception of Lindsey, these cases are discussed in Gunther. supra note 18, at 25-37.
33. See text accompanying notes 20 and 21 supra.

898

Washington's School Loitering Statute
showing of a real state interest on which to ground the classification; 34
and (2) the requirement of a rational means-ends relationship will be
more rigidly enforced than under the former standard. 35 That some
potency has been injected into the rational basis test is illustrated by
the extraordinary number of recent reversals and remands, 36 which
were clearly the exception rather than the rule before. This doctrinal
shift represents a departure from the rigid equal protection dichotomy
left by the Warren Court 37 and indicates that even if the classification
or interest infringed upon fails to slip neatly into one of the categories
calling for strict review under the compelling state interest test, it must
still undergo meaningful scrutiny under the emerging standard.
34. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971), where a unanimous Court
held that sex discrimination in a provision of the Idaho probate code was not rationally
related to the clear state purpose involved, which was to establish degrees of entitlement
of various classes of persons in accordance with their varying degrees and kinds of relationship to the intestate. The Court did not attempt to reach beyond the clear state purpose for any conceivable justifying interest. See also McGinnis v. Royster, 93 S. Ct.
1055 (1973) (New York parole statute held rationally related to avowed state purpose of
fostering rehabilitation. Mr. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, carefully disclaimed any hypothesizing by the Court of a state interest, 93 S. Ct. at 1063: "We
have supplied no imaginary basis for this statutory scheme ....
").
35. Compare Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (sustaining a Michigan
statute which provided that no woman could obtain a bartender's license unless she was
the wife or daughter of the male owner) with Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), two
cases representative of the old and current rational basis standards. The challenged classifications in both concerned differentiations based on sex. After careful examination of
alternatives, the Reed Court held the Idaho probate preference given males not rationally related to a legitimate state interest, while the GoesaertCourt accorded only perfunctory examination before broadly deferring to the judgment of the legislature and
upholding the bartending classification as being "not without a basis in reason."
36. The trend toward change was begun in the cases cited in note 32 supra, but definition of the new standard remains in a state of flux, exacerbated by continued citation
of cases decided under the old standard. Compare Mr. Justice Powell's use of Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), a case that relied on any reasonably conceivable state interest, as precedent in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
93 S. Ct. 1278 (1973), with his statement in McGinnis v. Royster, 93 S. Ct. 1055 (1973),
supra note 34.
A recent case has extended the trend of equal protection intervention without express
reliance on strict scrutiny into the present Term. See Gomez v. Perez, 93 S. Ct. 872
(1973) (denying illegitimates substantial benefits generally accorded children held unconstitutional, citing with approval Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164
(1972)). Whether this doctrinal movement ever solidifies into the complex analytical
model suggested in Gunther, supra note 18, at 20-25, is still an open question.
37. Dissatisfaction with the old dichotomy between the rational basis and compelling state interest standards began to surface even before the last Term. See, e.g., the
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Marshall in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,
520-21 (1970), wherein abandonment of the two-tier approach in favor of a sliding scale
formula was suggested. Although not representative of the new rational standard because of first amendment implications, Mosley also reflects this discontent. The majority
opinion in that case carefully avoided mention of such doctrinal terms as "strict scrutiny" and "compelling state interest," but spoke instead of what was suitable to further an
appropriate governmental interest. See note 15 supra.
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Analysis of R.C.W. § 9.87.010(13) under this test yields a result
identical to that produced by evaluation of the statute in the Oyen
context under the Mosley strict scrutiny standard. 38 Although a court
need not hypothesize a state purpose for enacting the Washington
statute because protection of the educational system is a real, explicit
state end, 39 broad exclusion of parents, guardians and school employees from the statute's operation fails to bear the requisite rational
relation to that end. Rational differentiations drawn by a school loitering statute must converge on the basic motivating standard of intent, or lack thereof, to disrupt materially the educational process.
The Washington statute's facial discrimination can meet this standard
only if the excepted classes are presumed to be free of this intent, but
as discussed supra,40 such a presumption is untenable. In addition to
not being necessary to further a compelling state interest, as demanded by strict scrutiny, 41 the Washington statute lacks the clear
and rational relation to a legitimate state interest required by the revitalized rational basis test of the Burger Court. The Court would find
no more rationality in the Washington statute's classification as a
means of preventing school disruption than it found in the discriminatory probate preference for men in Reed v. Reed 42 or the biased recouping of legal defense fees from indigent defendants in James v.
Strange.43 Thus, a simple remand to the trial court and subsequent
discharge of the Oyen defendants will not cure the defects inherent in
R.C.W. § 9.87.010(13). Serious equal protection problems under the
current rational basis standard remain, even after judicially excising
applications which trigger strict review.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE
The residual unconstitutionality of R.C.W. § 9.87.010(13) can be
eliminated by redrafting or by narrowly construing the statute so as to
eliminate the arbitrary classification that gave rise to Oyen and to
promote the legitimate state interest to be protected. A valid school

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
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See the discussion in the text accompanying notes 18-21 supra.
See note 29 stupra.
See the text accompanying notes 27-29 supra.
See the text accompanying note 20 supra for a statement of the strict standard.
404 U.S. 71 (1971).
407 U.S. 128 (1972).
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loitering statute should serve the community and state by focusing on
inchoate crime in the scholastic environment and smothering disruptive, criminal acts while still in the formative stage. As presently
drawn and construed, R.C.W. § 9.87.010(13) falls short of this goal
because some persons (members of the excepted classes) are left free
to enter upon school premises with even an avowed intent to commit
criminal disruption. Thus the defendants in Oyen, whose only purpose
was to distribute peacefully literature espousing a political cause prior
to class hours, were within the ambit of the statute, while a parental
group determined to disrupt an authorized plan for bussing students
probably would not be.44 As discussed above, this arbitrariness is fatal
under either equal protection standard.
The most obvious remedy which would assure that the statute conforms to its purpose while not overstepping the bounds drawn by current equal protection doctrine, is (1) to eliminate all exclusions except
that relating to students of the particular school, 45 and (2) to narrow
the prohibited activity to that which is done with an unlawful purpose.
The proposed unlawful purpose standard flows from the plain words
of the statute, 4 6 adequately protects the state interest involved by subsuming disruptive intent4 7 and does not raise the inference made by

44.

Such a group could still be prosecuted for the completed offense under Washing-

ton's campus disorder statute, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 28B.10.570-.573 (Supp. 1970),
noted in 47 WASH. L. REV. 501 (1972). Contrast this statute with WASH. REV. CODE §

9.87.010(13) (Supp. 1972), which is intended to intervene prior to the completed
criminal act.
45. See note 26 supra.
WASH. REV.
46. "[W] ho without a lawful purpose therefor wilfully loiters ....
CODE § 9.87.010(13) (Supp. 1972). See note I supra.
47. The standard of proscribed disruption will vary depending on the nature of the
activity regulated. E.g., a family picnic on schoolgrounds during class hours may be
only mildly disruptive, yet be subject to regulation because there obviously are more
appropriate locations for such conduct. However, a standard of mild disruption would
be inappropriate for a political speaker exercising his right of free expression on or near
the schoolyard; the first amendment requires that the standard be narrowed to material
and substantial disruption. See, e.g., Grayned, 408 U.S. at 118, where the Court held
that an anti-noise ordinance was constitutionally applicable to demonstrators voicing
racial grievances in front of a school only if the proscribed activity materially disrupted
classwork or involved substantial disorder. The Court cited Tinker v. Des Moines
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing of black anti-war armbands in school permissible even though representative of distracting and (to some) unpopular viewpoints).
The Grayned Court emphasized that this narrow standard was warranted because "we
must weigh heavily the fact that communication is involved." 408 U.S. at 116. Thus, a
court would have to be ever mindful of the nature of the activity regulated in determining the level of disruption properly prohibited.

901

Washington Law Review

Vol. 48: 891, 1973

the Oyen court that mere failure to obtain permission 48 or lack of a
school-related purpose may lead to conviction. Permission may still be
used by school authorities as a valid screening device to enforce the
statute, but only if denial of permission is clearly grounded upon the
statutory standard: unlawful purpose. 4 9 Coupling this more narrow
standard with elimination of the exemption of parents, guardians and
employees would produce a constitutional statute which better
achieves the vital purpose of a school loitering law. 50
Beyond the constitutionality of R.C.W. § 9.87.010(13), there lies
the broader inquiry of what the Oyen remand portends for laws in loi-

48. A permission requirement that is not tied to a definite and reasonable legislative
standard may lead to constitutional challenge. Broad permission-granting schemes which
lodged unfettered discretion in public officials to control speech-related activities have
been deemed unconstitutional by the Court under the equal protection clause (see, e.g.,
Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953), and Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268
(1951)) and under the first amendment (see, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S.
147 (1969) (ordinance that vested administrative officials with discretion to grant or
withhold parade permits upon broad criteria unrelated to proper regulation of public
places held violative of first amendment)).
49. Several specific aspects of such a screening system need to be considered. School
employees would have implied permission under their employment contracts to be present to carry out their appointed duties. However, at times and under circumstances
unrelated to such duties, school employees presumably would need specific permission.
For example, a part-time night watchman would not have automatic license to wander
about school premises during class hours absent a purpose clearly within the scope of
his employment.
With respect to first amendment activities, premising permission on lack of an unlawful purpose avoids lodging unfettered discretion in public officials (see note 48
supra) so long as the screening system strictly abides by the standard and does not become de facto discriminatory. Such a system constitutes a reasonable prior restraint on
speech, since a speaker could be turned away only if he had an unlawful, disruptive purpose. As pointed out in note 47 supra, the standard of proscribed disruption for
speakers would be necessarily higher than that for non-speech related conduct. The Supreme Court has held that properly limited discretion may be vested in administrative
officials to regulate speech-related activities in public places, so long as the regulation is
concerned with reasonable time, place and manner and is applied even-handedly. See
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 558 (1965); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395
(1953); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). This note will not investigate the
limits of the high school campus as a public forum. See Nahmod, Beyond Tinker: The
High School as an Educational Public Forum, 5 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS- Civ. LIB. L. REV.
278 (1970).
50. Presented with a nearly identical factual situation (adult distributing
anti-Vietnam war leaflets on high school campus), a California appellate court in
Mandel v. Muncipal Court, 276 Cal. App. 2d 649, 81 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1969), provided
the saving statutory construction which the Oyen court ignored. The questioned statute
was very similar to WASH. REV. CODE § 9.87.010(13) (Supp. 1972), reproduced in note I
supra.The California statute provided:
Every person who loiters about any school ... is a vagrant, and is punishable by a
fine of not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500) or by imprisonment in the county
jail for not exceeding six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 653g (West 1967). In holding that defendant was not within the pro-
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tering-related areas such as vagrancy, disorderly conduct and breach
of peace. 51 By applying equal protection to vacate a state decision
upholding a statute on other constitutional grounds, the United States
Supreme Court has demonstrated a willingness to expand the use of
equal protection as a tool for rejecting laws which contain classifications that bear only a tenuous relation, if any, to the state interest
sought to be furthered. This infirmity is common in loitering-related
areas, and the Oyen remand provides a warning that such laws are
now vulnerable to close constitutional scrutiny on a fresh doctrinal
ground.5 2 The fact that Oyen raised first amendment issues only intensified the level of equal protection review, as evidenced by the strict
approach of Mosley. But even if protected rights such as free speech

are not involved in the application of such laws, they still may be vulnerable to exacting review under recent decisions of the Burger Court.

R.W.E.

hibition of this statute, the appellate court wisely construed the term "loiters" to encompass only that species of lingering engaged in for an unlawful purpose:
It is only when the loitering is of such a nature that from the totality of the person's
actions and in the light of the prevailing circumstances, it may be reasonably concluded that it is being engaged in for the purpose of committing a crime as opportunity may be discovered.
81 Cal. Rptr. at 179. The appellate court concluded that although pamphleteers could
not be violent and heedless of the rights of others, the provisions of § 653g could not be
constitutionally construed to block the channels of peaceful communications or to stifle
peaceful activity. Id. at 189. Although Mandel was decided on the doctrinal bases of
vagueness and overbreadth, the narrowing construction of the appellate court fulfills the
requirements of the equal protection clause as well.
51. See note 8 supra for a discussion of these closely related areas.
52. There is also evidence that these laws are being subjected to closer scrutiny and
"less judicial deference" under the more commonly applied vagueness and overbreadth
doctrines. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (disorderly conduct statute overbroad), and Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (vagrancy ordinance void for vagueness).
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